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Do Firms Pay Bonuses to Protect Jobs?  
Balázs Reizer 
Abstract  
 
A large share of workers receives bonus payments besides their base wage. The benefits of 
flexible wage components in remuneration are twofold: they can incentivize workers and 
make it easier to adjust wages downward in response to negative shocks. Using data on bonus 
payments of Hungarian workers from linked employer-employee data, I disentangle the 
importance of these two factors to assess their respective importance. First, I show that 
bonus payments flexibly adjust to the revenue shocks of firms. At the same time, the 
separation rate of workers without bonuses do not react more to revenue changes than the 
separation rate of workers with bonuses. Bonus paying firms are shown to be financially 
more stable, larger and more productive, and they have less volatile revenue than firms not 
paying bonuses. These facts are consistent with a wage posting model with incentive 
contracting, but they are hard to reconcile with models emphasizing the role of bonus 
payments in alleviating wage rigidity. These results indicate that wage flexibility regulations 
may not affect the employment responses of firms to negative shocks. 
 
JEL: J31, J23, J42 
 
Keywords: Wage Level and Wage Structure, Labor Demand, Monopsony 
Acknowledgement 
 
I am extremly grateful to Gábor Kézdi, István Kónya and Attila Lindner for their continuous 
guidance throughout the project. I would also like to thank Hedvig Horváth, Attila Gáspár, 
Győző Gyöngyösi, Miklós Koren, János Köllö, Botond Köszegi, Róbert Lieli, Monika Merz 
Rita Petö, Ádám Szeidl, Álmos Telegdy, Ádám Vereckei, and the audiences of the CERS-HAS; 
2015 PhD conference of the Hungarian Society of Economists for very helpful comments. 
Support from the Review in Economic Studies and from the Firms, Strategy and Performance 
Lendület Grant of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is gratefully acknowledged. All errors 
are mine. 
 
 
4 
 
Megvédik a bónuszok a munkahelyeket  
negatív sokkok esetén?  
Reizer Balázs 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A munkavállalók jelentős része bónuszokat és egyéb bérelemeket kap az alapbér mellett.  
A rugalmas bérelemeknek két előnyük van. Egyrészt nagyobb erőfeszítésre ösztönzik a 
munkavállalókat, másrészt szükség esetén könnyen elvehetők, így a segítik a vállalatokat a 
negatív árbevételi sokkokhoz való alkalmazkodásban. Dolgozatomban a Bértarifa-felmérés 
egyéni szintű bérszerkezet-adatait felhasználva megbecsülöm ennek a két előnynek a relatív 
fontosságát. Először megmutatom, hogy a bónuszok valóban jobban reagálnak a vállalat 
árbevételének változására. Ezzel szemben még a bónusz nélküli, rugalmatlan bérekkel 
rendelkező munkavállalók sem veszítik el az állásukat nagyobb valószínűséggel, ha csökken a 
vállalat árbevétele. Emellett a bónuszt fizető vállalatok pénzügyileg stabilabbak: 
termelékenyebbek, több a munkavállalójuk és kevésbé volatilis az árbevételük, mint a bónusz 
nélküli vállalatoknak. Ezek az empirikus tények nehezen összeegyeztethetők azokkal a 
modellekkel, amelyek szerint a lefelé való bérmerevségnek foglalkoztatási költsége van. 
Azonban az eredményeim egybecsengenek egy olyan modellel, amelyben a munkavállalók 
véletlenszerűen kapnak ösztönző és fix béres állásajánlatokat. Dolgozatom végkövetkeztetése, 
hogy a bérmerevségek foglalkoztatási költsége nem jelentős. 
 
JEL: J31, J23, J42 
Tárgyszavak: Bérszínvonal és bér szerkezet, Munkakereslet, Monopszómium 
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of ﬂexible wage components in remuneration are twofold: they can incentivize workers and
make it easier to adjust wages downward in response to negative shocks. Using data on
bonus payments of Hungarian workers from linked employer-employee data, I disentangle
the importance of these two factors to assess their respective importance. First, I show
that bonus payments ﬂexibly adjust to the revenue shocks of ﬁrms. At the same time, the
separation rate of workers without bonuses do not react more to revenue changes than the
separation rate of workers with bonuses. Bonus paying ﬁrms are shown to be ﬁnancially more
stable, larger and more productive, and they have less volatile revenue than ﬁrms not paying
bonuses. These facts are consistent with a wage posting model with incentive contracting, but
they are hard to reconcile with models emphasizing the role of bonus payments in alleviating
wage rigidity. These results indicate that wage ﬂexibility regulations may not aﬀect the
employment responses of ﬁrms to negative shocks.
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1 Introduction
Bonus compensations are widespread at workplaces. Recent evidence shows that half of the
workers receive bonus payments in addition to their base wage in the United States (Bloom
et. al. 2011). The share of workers with bonuses has increased over time both in the United
States and in Western European countries (Lawler and Mohrman, 2003; Lazear and Shaw,
2008).
The causes and consequences of bonus payments are not well understood. One strand of
the literature argues that bonuses are paid to incentivize workers (Holmström 1979; 1982;
Card and Hyslop, 1997; Grossman and D, 1981; Levin, 2003)1. By linking wage compensation
to output, ﬁrm owners reduce the moral hazard in their workers' eﬀort. As a result, the total
compensation of bonus receiving workers co-moves with the changes in revenues of ﬁrms.
These models also imply that ﬁrms with less volatile revenue shocks are more likely to pay
bonuses.
In other papers, bonuses are perceived as a way to cushion the eﬀects of negative rev-
enue shocks on employment (Weitzman, 1983; 1985; Jerger and Michaelis 1999; Koskela and
Stenbacka 2006). In these models, ﬂexible wages allow ﬁrms to react at the level of the wage
margin rather than the employment margin in response to negative revenue shocks. When
adjusting employment is costly, these models predict that ﬁrms with more volatile revenues
are more likely to have ﬂexible wage components.
While both of these explanations might play a role in paying bonuses, estimating their
relative importance has major policy implications. If the ﬂexibility of bonuses leads to lower
separation rates in case of negative revenue shocks then public policies subsidizing bonus
payments can grease the wheels and decrease frictional unemployment when inﬂation is
low (Tobin, 1972; Weitzman, 1987). By contrast, if bonus payments do not protect jobs,
such policies are unlikely to impact the level of employment.
1Field experiments showed also that the productivity of workers signiﬁcantly increases after the introduc-
tion of output-based compensation (Lazear, 000a; Shearer, 2004; Bandiera et al., 2005).
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In this paper, I distinguish these two explanations by exploiting a unique linked employer-
employee database that contains detailed worker-level information on the structure of earn-
ings (and bonus payments) and also ﬁrm-level income statement information. These data
allow me to estimate employment and wage responses to idiosyncratic revenue shocks, and
to test whether these responses are diﬀerent for workers with and without bonuses. First,
I demonstrate that bonus payments are ﬂexibly adjusted to ﬁrm-level revenue shocks, while
base wages are more rigid. Second, I show that workers with bonuses are not more likely to
keep their job in response to negative revenue shocks compared to ﬁxed-wage workers. This
reduced-form evidence indicates that while bonuses make wages more ﬂexible, the ﬂexibility
of bonus payments does not protect jobs in case of negative revenue shocks.
Still, the incidence of bonus payments is not random but an endogenous decision of ﬁrms.
To incorporate the choice of ﬁrms on pay structure into my analysis, I develop a tractable
wage posting model that distinguishes formally between the consequences of wage ﬂexibility
and the incentive contract explanation for bonus payments. I build on the standard wage
posting model of Manning (2003; 2004) that examines optimal wage setting in an equilibrium
framework. In this model, ﬁrms oﬀering a higher wage are able to ﬁll their jobs more quickly,
but they earn less proﬁt per worker. In equilibrium, wages are determined by the level of
unemployment, the (exogenous) job separation rate and the productivity of ﬁrms.
In the standard wage posting model, ﬁrms are restricted to oﬀer ﬁxed-wage contracts. To
analyze bonus payments, I extend the model in two directions. First, I capture the incen-
tivizing eﬀect of bonuses by assuming that the eﬀort of workers is unobserved. Accordingly,
as in the hidden action model of Hölmstrom (1979), ﬁrms make inferences about the eﬀort
of workers by observing the actual output (total revenue). However, the more volatile the
revenue shocks are, the harder it is to draw such an inference, and if the revenue is too noisy,
ﬁrms simply opt for a ﬁxed-wage contract. In the model, ﬁrms (exogenously) diﬀer in the
volatility of revenue shocks which also explains why some ﬁrms choose to pay bonuses, while
others do not.
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The second extension to the model introduces endogenous job separation by allowing ﬁrms
to ﬁre workers. A temporary negative shock in revenue pushes ﬁrms to reduce employment at
least temporarily. However, laying oﬀ employees is costly, because ﬁnding a worker later takes
time. Therefore, ﬁrms will keep their workers even if their marginal product is somewhat
lower than their actual wage. While ﬂexible wages allow ﬁrms to adjust wages to the marginal
product of labor, and so reduce employment ﬂuctuations, they also create ﬂuctuations in
wages that workers dislike. Again, the volatility of revenue plays a crucial role in determining
whether bonus payments are optimal. When volatility is low, ﬁxed wages are oﬀered and
ﬁrms do not react to temporary revenue shocks. For medium-sized shocks, bonus payments
are provided, and as a result, employment ﬂuctuations are attenuated relative to the ﬁxed
contract arrangement. Finally, for very high volatility in revenue, a ﬁxed-wage contract is
chosen and ﬁrms respond to negative shocks at the level of the employment margin.
While both hidden action and endogenous job separation can explain why some ﬁrms
pay bonuses while others do not, they have radically diﬀerent predictions for the type of
ﬁrms paying bonuses. The incentive contract model predicts that ﬁrms with bonuses have
less volatility in revenue, they are more productive and are larger in general. By contrast,
endogenous job separation anticipates that ﬁrms with bonuses will be smaller and predicts
an inverted U-shape relationship between bonus payments and revenue volatility.
I compare these theoretical predictions with the pattern of bonus payments in Hungary.
My empirical results are in line with the incentive contract explanation. Bonus paying ﬁrms
are more productive, and they have more employees and less volatile growth rates than ﬁrms
without bonuses. The relationship between the prevalence of bonus payments and revenue
volatility is strictly decreasing in contrast to the non-monotonic relationship implied by the
endogenous separation model. Bonus paying ﬁrms adjust wages more but they do not smooth
employment more in the event of negative revenue shocks. This observation, again, is very
hard to reconcile with the endogenous job separation proposed above.
I also carry out several robustness checks of the empirical ﬁndings. Using a broad set of
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control variables and alternative sample selections barely aﬀects the point estimates. The
results are also robust to changing the deﬁnition of bonus payments. Bonuses have similar
eﬀects across the various subsamples.
At the end of the paper, I brieﬂy discuss alternative explanations for bonus payments.
First, ﬁrms may pay bonuses to screen the best workers. In this case, the optimal strategy
for ﬁrms is to oﬀer a menu of wages and let workers choose between a ﬁxed wage and revenue
sharing. However, I ﬁnd that a high share of ﬁrms pay bonuses to all of their workers.
Second, ﬁrms may pay bonuses mainly to cope with outside wage oﬀers. However, in this
case, it is hard to understand why bonus paying ﬁrms are more productive than ﬁrms without
bonuses. Third, ﬁrms may be larger and more productive, and decide to pay bonuses because
they have a more able management. I used ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects to control for the diﬀerences in
time-invariant managerial skills and the results remained the same.
This paper draws on the extensive literature on downward wage rigidity. Recent research
(Card and Hyslop, 1997; Altonji and Devereux, 2000; Dickens et al., 2006; Kátay, 2011;
Daly et al., 2012) provides ample evidence of downward wage rigidity in many countries
and industries2. Bonuses, however, have been found to respond more to aggregate shocks
(Oyer 2005; Messina et al. 2010; Anger 2011; Lemieux et al. 2012). My results conﬁrm these
previous ﬁndings, but also extend them by connecting the ﬂexibility of bonus payments to
ﬁrm-level revenue shocks.
In spite of its policy relevance, there is little direct evidence on the negative eﬀect of
wage rigidity on the level of employment. The only exceptions are Fehr and Goette (2005);
Stokes et al. (2014) and Schoefer (2015). On the contrary, Elsby (2009) argues that ﬁrms
only increase wages if they expect that the new wage level will not need to be decreased, and
for this reason, downward wage rigidity does not have signiﬁcant employment costs. I present
an other argument for the limited relevance of wage ﬂexibility to employment ﬂuctuations.
2The corresponding theoretical models mostly assume that wage cuts decrease the eﬀort of workers (Ak-
erlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Chemin and Kurmann, 2014) or that wages can be adjusted only costly
(MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993; Arseneau and Chugh, 2008).
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My results suggest that ﬁrms have instruments to ease the eﬀects of negative revenue shocks
and would be able to achieve wage ﬂexibility if they wanted to, but they choose a rigid
wage structure independent of cyclical considerations. Consequently, the employment cost
of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) may be overestimated and the main reason of
unemployment in a low-inﬂation environment is in fact not the wage rigidity of incumbents.
My results also relate to wage posting models involving heterogeneous jobs. Postel-Vinay
and Turon (2010); Robin (2011); Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013); Bagger et al. (2014)
develop wage posting models with productivity shocks while (Pinheiro and Visschers, 2015;
Jarosch, 2014) directly assume that jobs diﬀer in the probability of separations. These
papers include important predictions for separation rates and wage dynamics. My model
complements these results by predicting cross-sectional diﬀerences in wage structure as well.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets forth a simple wage posting model
with incentive contracts and endogenous separations. Section 3 describes the Hungarian
institutional context. Section 4 introduces the database. Section 5 shows the wage adjustment
and separation rates of workes with and without bonuses. Section 6 tests the implications of
the model for the volatility of ﬁrm revenue. Section 7 assesses alternative explanations for
bonus payment, and ﬁnally Section 8 presents the conclusions of the paper.
2 Model
In this section, I provide a theoretical framework for analyzing why ﬁrms pay bonuses and
what empirically testable consequences the underlying reasons have. In Section 2.1, I intro-
duce the baseline wage posting model of Manning (2003; 2004) with worker-level productivity
shocks. The idea of bonus payment is incorporated using linear contracts as I assume that
ﬁrms can oﬀer a ﬁxed base wage and share part of the revenue with the worker. I follow
the strategy of Manning (2003; 2004) and I only describe the steady-state characteristics
of the economy without evaluating model dynamics, so time indeces are suppressed in the
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derivations.
My contribution to the literature is that I derive the optimal strategy for bonus payments
if bonuses have incentive eﬀects and ﬁrms can lay oﬀ workers upon case of negative revenue
shocks. My ultimate goal is to distinguish the two explanations that is why I discuss the two
models separately and I derive empirically testable predictions.
First I incorporate the incentive eﬀects of bonus payment to the baseline model in Section
2.2. I assume that workers have two discrete eﬀort levels which are not observed by the
employer. In this setup the revenue sharing is an instrument to motivate workers to exert
higher eﬀort.
Second, I allow ﬁrms to lay oﬀ workers if a negative shock hits the ﬁrm and the value
of the worker-ﬁrm match turns negative (Section 2.3)3. This kind of endogenous separation
catches the idea that ﬁrms may ﬁre workers if they cannot cut wages. Here the ﬁrms use
revenue sharing to increase the proﬁt of the match in recession by allocating part of the
negative revenue shocks on the worker.
2.1 Setup of the baseline model
This section introduced the baseline wage posting model with worker level revenue shocks.
The extensions and testable predictions can be found in Section 2.2. and 2.3.
Workers
There are M mass of workers with identical productivity. The workers seek for the job
with the highest expected utility. The outside option of workers ensures U0 utility which can
be conceived of as the utility value of the unemployment beneﬁt or the value of leisure time.
The workers are risk averse and maximize the expected utility of their income without caring
about temporary revenue shocks. The utility of worker i employed by ﬁrm j over her income
has mean variance form:
3For case of simplicity I assume in Section 2.3. that revenue sharing has no incentive eﬀect.
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U(Wij) = E(Wij)− r ∗ V ar(Wij) (1)
Firms
There is a unit mass of of ﬁrms and every ﬁrm is inﬁnitesimally small compared to the
labor market. Firms observe only the total revenue produced by the workers. The total
revenue can be decomposed to into two parts:
piij = p+ εij
where p denotes the expected value of the revenue and εij is a random revenue shocks.
For analytical convenience, I assume that the εij has normal distribution with zero mean
and V ar(ε) variance.4. The shocks are independent across workers but they have the same
variance within ﬁrms. H(var(εj)) stands for the distribution of the variance of revenue
shocks across ﬁrms. The only cost of production is the wage paid to employees. As workers
are identically risk averse, ﬁrms oﬀer the same linear contract to every worker:
Wij = wj + bj ∗ piij
where wj > 0 is the ﬁxed wage and ﬁrms share bj ∈ [0, 1] part of the total revenue with
the workers. bj ∗ piij can be interpreted as the bonus part of worker compensation. V ar(εij)
is common knowledge, so workers know the expected utility of wage oﬀers before they accept
or reject them. I follow Manning (2003) and I assume that the output of the ﬁrms is linear
in the number of employees. Besides ﬁrms are risk-neutral and aim at maximizing expected
proﬁt:
max
wj ,bj
E((1− bj) ∗ piij − wj) ∗Nj(wj, bj) (2)
4The predictions of the results are robust against changing the distribution of shocks and the utility
function of the workers as long as the workers are risk averse.
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where Nj is the number of workers at the ﬁrm. Nj depends on the wage, as ﬁrms engaging
in oligopsonistic competition have more workers if they pay higher wages.
Uj is used to denote the expected utility of workers at ﬁrm j.
Uij = wj + bj ∗ E(piij)− r ∗ b2jvar(εij) (3)
Substituting Equation 3 into 2 we get the following proﬁt maximization problem:
max
Uj ,bj
E((piij − r ∗ b2jvar(εj)− Uj) ∗Nj(Uj, bj) (4)
This form of the proﬁt maximization problem is more convenient as I will show below
that the size of the ﬁrm depends only on the utility oﬀered by ﬁrm j.
Matching
Individuals receive a wage oﬀer described by {wj, bj} in every period with probability λ
from a random ﬁrm5 and workers lose their job and become unemployed with a probability
of δ. The probability of getting an oﬀer is independent from the labor market status of
individuals and the separation rate is independent from the characteristics of ﬁrms. These
assumption ensures that accepting a wage oﬀer has no negative eﬀects on the future income6.
Individuals maximize only the certainty equivalent value of their income, so conditionally
on Uj they do not care about the value of bj and individuals accept every wage oﬀer which
provides a higher expected utility than their current utility. Subsequently this extended model
inherits the equilibrium characteristics of the original Manning model as in equilibrium: (i)
the expected size of the ﬁrms are constant over time, (ii) the distribution of ﬁrm sizes is a
5Although the ﬁrms are inﬁnitesimally small compared to the labor market, they have some monopsony
power over workers as the probability of receiving a better wage oﬀer than the current wage is less than 1.
6If a ﬁrm oﬀers a lower expected utility to the individuals than her outside option, no worker would accept
that oﬀer. That is why any wage oﬀer should provide at least U0 utility to the worker and the unemployed
always accept the wage oﬀers.
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deterministic function of a non-degenerate wage oﬀer distribution F (Uj).
Lemma 1:The cumulative distribution function of Uj is strictly increasing and continuous
between the minimum and the maximum of Uj.
Proof: Assume that the distribution of Uj is not strictly increasing, then there is a (U, U¯)
interval without a corresponding wage oﬀer. Firms initially oﬀering U¯ utility could raise proﬁt
by decreasing wages as the wage cut would raise the proﬁt per worker without aﬀecting ﬁrm
size. Similarly, if the distribution of Uj is non-continuous, it means that a non-negligible
share of ﬁrms would oﬀer the same utility to their workers (U∗j ). However, in this case, it is
proﬁtable for any ﬁrm oﬀering U∗j utility to increase the oﬀered utility with an inﬁnitesimally
small amount and attract some part of the employees from the ﬁrms that still oﬀer U∗j utility.
That is why, in equilibrium, the wage oﬀer distribution is dispersed even if var(εj) is the
same for every ﬁrm. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) also show that there is an equilibrium
even if ﬁrms are heterogeneous with respect to productivity and the ﬁrms which have higher
revenue per worker also oﬀer higher wages.
Up until now I assumed that the workers dislike revenue sharing and it is not beneﬁcial for
the ﬁrms either. That is why in the following sections I made further assumptions. In Section
2.2 I assume that the revenue sharing can be an incentive for workers, while in Section 2.3 I
assume that ﬁrms can lay oﬀ workers in case of negative revenue shocks. I also demonstrate
how the revenue sharing parameter depends on the variance of the revenue of ﬁrms under
these assumptions and derive empirically testable predictions.
2.2 Bonus payment as a tool of incentive contracts
In this section, I assume that workers can make either a high or either a low eﬀort level.
The eﬀort of workers is denoted by e. Low eﬀort level is normalized to 0 while high eﬀort
makes e¯ proﬁt to the ﬁrm and costs ce¯ to the worker. Under these assumptions, the utility
of the worker has the following form:
U(W (eij), eij) = E(Wij)− r ∗ var(Wij)− ceij (5)
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and the revenue produced by worker i at ﬁrm j is:
piij =

p+ e¯+ εij
p+ εij
if the worker′s effort is high
if the worker′s effort is low
(6)
.
Similarly to the previous section, workers are identical so ﬁrms oﬀer the same Uj and bj
to all of their employees and workers make the same eﬀort within ﬁrm. In equilibrium, the
wage oﬀer distribution of ﬁrms has to meet the condition under Proposition 1 regardless of
the distribution of Uj.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, there are two possible values of the proﬁt sharing parameter
bj.
bj =

c if e¯∗(1−c)
c2∗r ≥ var(εj)
0 otherwise
(7)
Proof : see Appendix
According to Proposition 1, ﬁrms with low enough variance in their sales can make their
workers to exert high eﬀort. . However, if workers are more risk-averse (r is larger) or the
cost of making higher eﬀort (c) is larger, fewer ﬁrms will want to choose incentive contracts.
The second implication of Proposition 1 is that ﬁrms that use incentive contracts share the
same proportion of their gross proﬁt with their workers independently from var(εj). The
lower bound of the proﬁt sharing parameter is pinned down by the incentive compatibility
constraint of workers. If bj is too low, workers will shirk. As workers are risk averse ﬁrms
want to use the lowest possible proﬁt sharing which ensures high eﬀort so bj is the same
at every revenue sharing ﬁrm. Therefore, in equilibrium, workers should be indiﬀerent to
shirking and making a high eﬀort even if they are oﬀered a positive bj. By contrast, the ﬁrms
which cannot observe the eﬀort of workers precisely enough are better oﬀ by providing ﬁxed
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wage contracts and allowing low eﬀort. Since I interpret revenue sharing as bonus payment,
Proposition 1 suggests that the volatility of sales revenue at bonus paying ﬁrms is lower than
in the case of ﬁrms not paying bonuses.
Using the results of Proposition 1, the following notation can be applied:
Pj =

p+ e¯− c2 ∗ r ∗ var(εj) if e¯∗(1−c)c2∗r ≥ var(εj)
p otherwise
(8)
Pj only depends on exogenously given parameters and it can be interpreted as a measure
of productivity as this is the output per worker remaining after compensating workers for
income uncertainty. Equation 8 suggests that ﬁrms characterized by a lower uncertainty in
their output can achieve higher proﬁt per worker. The strength of this approach is that the
distribution of Pj is a deterministic function of H(var(εj)). Using Pj we can also write up the
ﬁrms' problem only as the function of the utility provided and the distribution of utilities7
oﬀered by other ﬁrms (F ). As mentioned before, in the equilibrium of the economy, the size
of ﬁrms is constant. Using the notation Pj the proﬁt maximization problem in Equation 4
can be rewritten in the following way:
max
Uj
(Pj − Uj) ∗N(U j, F (U j)) (9)
Equation 9 suggests that the proﬁt depends only on the exogenously given productivity
measure and the utility provided by the ﬁrm. After this restructuring of the proﬁt equa-
tion, the equilibrium properties of the model become identical with the original Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) with heterogeneity in ﬁrms' productivity. Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
also showed that there is no general formula for F but derived the suﬃcient conditions for
equilibrium.
The empirically testable characteristics of the equilibrium in my extended model are as
7Note: At ﬁrms oﬀering ﬁxed wage contracts bj = 0 and Uj = wj while at ﬁrms oﬀering incentive contracts
bj = c and Uj = wj + c(p+ e)− c ∗ r ∗ var(εj).
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follows:
Proposition 2. Firms using incentive contracts oﬀer a higher utility to the workers and
have larger size than ﬁrms oﬀering ﬁxed wage contracts.
Proof : see Appendix
As Equation 6 illustrates, ﬁrms oﬀering incentive contracts can achieve higher proﬁt
per worker even after compensating the workers for the uncertainty in their wage. In an
oligopsonistic environment, more proﬁtable ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages to attract the workers of
less productive ﬁrms. Although it is possible that these ﬁrms will have an even lower proﬁt
per worker, as they will have more workers, their total proﬁt will be higher. As an another
consequence of Proposition 2, if a worker having an incentive contract got a ﬁxed wage oﬀer
she would not accept it as the ﬁxed wage contract would provide her lower utility. On the
contrary, workers who have a ﬁxed wage contract always accept wage oﬀers which come with
an incentive contract.
2.3 Bonus payment as a tool of wage ﬂexibility
In this section, I derive the optimal strategy for bonus payments if ﬁrms can ﬁre workers
in case of negative revenue shocks. As I want to separate the incentive contract and wage
ﬂexibility explanation of bonus payments, I assume that revenue sharing does not have in-
centive eﬀects and the interest rate is 0. Now, suppose that worker-level revenue shocks have
binary outcomes, and they take the value of −εijt or εijt randomly with equal probability.
This setup is equivalent with a simple Markov-chain process where there is a recession state
and a boom state and the probability of regime change is 50 percent. I also assume that
ﬁrst ﬁrms observe the actual state of εijt and they can decide whether they want to separate
the workers before the payoﬀs are realized. So ﬁrms can separate workers if the expected
value of the match turns negative:
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Pj − Uj + (1− bj)εijt +
∞∑
s=1
(λ(1− F (Uj)) + δj)sE(Pj − Uj + (1− bj)εij,t+s) < 0 (10)
As the expected proﬁt of ﬁrms is always positive, Equation 10 formalizes the intuition that
ﬁrms want to separate workers only in a recession period when εijt is negative. Separation is
also more likely if the variance of revenue shocks is larger. On the contrary, ﬁrms can protect
jobs and increase proﬁt during recession by raising the revenue sharing parameter bj. Since
the expected value of revenue shocks in the next period is zero, the revenue sharing parameter
decreases the chance of layoﬀs. On the other hand, larger revenue sharing decreases the utility
of the worker who will therefore want to leave voluntarily with a higher probability. Similarly,
ﬁrms will be more likely to ﬁre workers if the exogenous separation rate is larger because in
this case the discounted value of proﬁt decreases. If the proﬁtability measure Pj is larger
than a more extreme negative shock is needed to change the sign of the present value of the
job. At last, it is not obvious how the utility provided by the ﬁrm aﬀects the likelihood of
separations. On the one hand, it decreases the per period proﬁt of the ﬁrm so lower even
smaller negative shocks can turn the value of the match negative and induce layeoﬀs. On the
other, Uj also decreases the probability of voluntary exits.
Using Equation 10, Proposition 3 follows:
Proposition 3. Firms with medium-size variance in their sales pay bonuses and never ﬁre
their workers. Firms with the lowest variance do not share their sales and do not ﬁre workers
either. If var(εj) is above a certain threshold level, ﬁrms oﬀer ﬁxed-wage contracts and ﬁre
their workers in case of negative revenue shocks.
Proof : see Appendix
The ﬁrst-order conditions of Equation 4 show that total proﬁt of the ﬁrm is deceasing in
bj. So ﬁrms smoothing employment choose the smallest bj which ensures that the expected
value of the match is not negative in recession. If var(εj) is small enough, the expected
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value of the match is positive during recession even without any proﬁt sharing, but if var(εj)
exceeds a certain threshold then ﬁrms need to share their sales with the worker to increase
the expected value of the match during recession. Revenue sharing decreases the utility of
workers and ﬁrms have to compensate workers for income uncertainty. That is why ﬁrms
with larger var(εj) have lower proﬁt per worker. As Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show
that these ﬁrms will oﬀer lower utility to the worker which implies smaller employment and
larger turnover. Finally, if the variance of the sales revenue is very large, it is not proﬁtable
to share sales because the utility cost of uncertainty is too large. In this case, ﬁrms oﬀer a
ﬁxed wage but ﬁre workers if the match is hit by a negative revenue shock.
The testable implications of this extension to the model are as follows:
Proposition 4. If proﬁt sharing does not aﬀect the eﬀort of workers, ﬁrms without bonuses
have (a) a larger variance in their sales revenue and a pro-cyclical separation rate or (b)
lower variance in their sales revenue and an acyclical separation rate.
Proposition 4 reveals that there are two types of ﬁrms without bonuses. Firms of the ﬁrst
type have so large variance in their sales that is is more costly to cannot counterbalance the
eﬀects of negative shocks that they are better oﬀ by providing ﬁxed wages. These ﬁrms ﬁre
their workers in the case of negative shocks. By contrast, ﬁrms with the lowest variance in
their sales can smooth employment without proﬁt sharing even in case of negative revenue
shocks. As these ﬁrms do not need to compensate their workers for uncertainty, they can oﬀer
the highest utility and will be the largest as well. The net eﬀect of these two channels can be
estimated empirically. On the one hand, if there are ﬁrms which cannot smooth employment
then the separation rate of ﬁrms without bonuses will have to be more negatively correlated
with sales than the separation rate of ﬁrms paying bonuses. On the other hand, if every ﬁrm
can smooth employment, ﬁrms without bonuses will have the lowest variance in their sales
revenue. These ﬁrms will oﬀer the highest utility to their workers and will have the largest
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ﬁrm size.
Based on this results, we can compare the wage ﬂexibility explanation and the incentive
contract explanation for bonus payments. If ﬁrms pay bonuses mainly to enhance worker
eﬀort, we may expect that ﬁrms paying bonuses are larger, more productive and have lower
variance in their sales revenue subject to their size of employment8. If the most important
motivation for paying bonuses is to smooth revenue shocks then the largest ﬁrms do not pay
bonuses. On the contrary, bonus paying ﬁrms have a larger variance in their sales revenue
but they are smaller on the average and adjust their employment less due to sales revenue
shocks. After introducing the data, I outline the empirical tests of these predictions.
3 Institutional background
Employment contracts in Hungary have to specify the amount of the monthly base wage
which can be decreased only with the consent of workers. However, if worker compensation
is based on piece rate or is paid on an hourly basis, the minimum amount of monthly payment
has to exceed only half of the base wage 9. According to the Wage Dynamics Network Survey,
Hungarian ﬁrms adjust base wage every 13.8 months and 80 percent of ﬁrms adjust wages
once a year. The frequency of wage changes is slightly lower in other European countries, for
example, ﬁrms in the eurozone change wages every 15 month on average (Druant et al., 2012).
Firms can modify other elements in the compensation package of workers without any legal
constraints. Additional monetary elements over the base wage account for approximately 10
percent of total worker compensation. This share is close to the Western European average
(Kézdi and Kónya, 2011).
Employment protection institutions in general are more similar to the Anglo-Saxon regimes
8If sales revenue shocks are not perfectly correlated across workers, the relative volatility in sales revenue
is decreasing with the size of employment. For this reason, I also control for the number of workers in the
regressions.
9According to the Wage Survey, 15 percent of the workers are paid on an hourly basis or based on a piece
rate.
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than to those found in Continental countries. It is relatively simple to dismiss workers (Ri-
boud et al., 2002; Tonin, 2009) and collective wage bargaining is also based on the ﬁrm-level
agreements of the unions (Rigó, 2012). The share of union members is approximately 20
percent, which is relatively low compared to other OECD countries (OECD, 2004). Apart
from ﬁrm-level bargaining, industry-level agreements are rare and set only very week require-
ments (Neumann, 2006). The unions participate also in the country-level bargaining forum
called National Interest Reconciliation Council. The Council is a tripartite forum of union
federations, employer associations and the government, and it makes recommendations for
wage increases and sets an obligatory minimum wage for the next year 10. The recommenda-
tions for wage increases are not legally enforced and the share of ﬁrms using automatic wage
indexation policies is also low (Druant et al., 2012).
The macroeconomic environment can be divided into two diﬀerent periods. As Panel (a)
of Figure 1 in the Appendix demonstrates, the inﬂation rate was relatively high before 2001
and moderately low afterwards. As inﬂation greatly aﬀects wage adjustment, I repeat my
estimations on these two subsamples separately. My results are robust to changes in inﬂation.
Panel (b) shows real GDP growth and the employment-population ratio. This ﬁgure reveals
that the economy was relatively stable and there was no recession before 2008.
4 Data
I use the Hungarian linked employer-employee survey for estimation. The wage information
comes from the Hungarian Structure of Earnings Survey. The survey is repeated every year
and involves a quasi-random 6 percent sample of Hungarian employees and their income in
May. The workers can be followed between years if they do not leave the ﬁrm. Appendix XXX
discusses the construction of panel on the worker level The database contains a wide range
10While the government can set the minimum wage unilaterally, the parties managed to agree on the
minimum wage in every year except for 2001Rigó (2012).
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of personal information (age, gender, education, occupation ). The database is unique as it
contains information not only about total compensation but also about the diﬀerent wage
parts. In addition to the base wage, the Wage Survey records extra payments for overtime,
night and weekend shifts, allowances for special working conditions, knowledge of foreign
languages, premia as well as regular and irregular bonuses11. Moreover, wage information is
reported by the ﬁrms and not by the individuals, so measurement error is less of an issue. I
deﬁne workers as receiving bonus if they got at least one type of extra payment in addition
to their base wage in any year during the periods observed Lemieux et al. (2009).
Firm-level data come from the corporate income tax returns collected by the National
Tax and Customs Administration. The database contains the balance sheet and income
statement of every double entry book-keeping ﬁrm. The ﬁrms also have a unique identiﬁer
so they can be followed over time and ﬁrm-level revenue shocks can also be measured.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Graph 1 outlines the relationship between the size of the ﬁrm and bonus payments. I grouped
the worker-year observations into 20 bins by ﬁrm size and plotted the average share of workers
receiving a bonus in every bin. This non-parametric estimate shows that the larger the ﬁrms
are the more likely it is that their workers receive a bonus. This result is in line with the wage
ﬂexibility explanation for bonus payments. To ensure common support for workers receiving
a bonus, I conﬁne my attention to ﬁrms having less than 2500 workers. For the purpose of
robustness checks, I repeat every estimation also on the sub-sample of ﬁrms with less than
500 employees. I also drop observations where the ﬁrm has less than 20 workers so it cannot
be followed automatically over time. The vertical lines show sample restrictions. Due to
data availability issues, I use the waves of wage surveys conducted between 1995 and 2010
for the present analysis. The analysis is restricted to private sector ﬁrms since the wage and
11The sum of the base wage and other wage parts do not need to be equal to the total compensation in
the database. Such diﬀerence is deﬁned by paid and unpaid leaves.
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employment decisions of public sector ﬁrms are substantially aﬀected by politics in Hungary
(Telegdy 2013a, 2013b).
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the diﬀerent wage elements. The ﬁrst
column shows that approximately 78 percent of workers receive at least one type of additional
wage element and workers earn usually more than one type of additional wage elements. The
most widespread type of additional elements are occasional bonuses while monthly bonuses
have the largest share in the compensation package of workers, provided that they receive
such a wage element.
.
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for the ﬁnal sample. As the change of
wages can be computed only for workers remaining at the same ﬁrm over the years, I show
the means for this group as well. The summary statistics are also in line with the incentive
contract explanation for bonus payments. Bonus-receiving workers have a higher wage and
work at larger, more productive and more proﬁtable ﬁrms. Workers receiving bonuses work
at ﬁrms where the share of new entrants is lower. This is not surprising as in equilibrium ﬁrm
size is constant so the separation rate and the share of new entrants are equal in every ﬁrm.
As ﬁrms oﬀering ﬁxed wage contracts are less attractive to workers of bonus paying ﬁrms, the
separation rate for bonus paying ﬁrms will be lower. We cannot see considerable diﬀerences
in the case of other characteristics. Workers receiving a bonus have a similar age, years of
education and there is no great diﬀerence in the sex ratio either. The main conclusion to
be drawn from the right panel is that workers remaining at the ﬁrm are similar to the total
sample. The only diﬀerence is that workers in this subsample work at slightly larger ﬁrms.
Using the individual-level panel, I construct the distribution of wage changes for workers
with and without a bonus. These distributions are able to reﬂect the downward nominal
rigidity of the diﬀerent wage elements. If wages are downward rigid, ﬁrms can only decrease
average labor compensation by ﬁring their workers and hiring new ones for a lower wage. If
replacing workers is costly, wage rigidity results in upward pressure on wages and positive
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excess mass or bunching may be expected at small increases and a spike at 0 in the distri-
bution of wage changes. By contrast, if wages are ﬂexible, it is expected that the distribution
of wage changes is continuous around 0. This means that the probability of an inﬁnitesimally
small wage decrease should be roughly the same as the probability of an inﬁnitesimally small
wage increase. Graph ?? presents the log-changes of wages. The distributions are winsorized
at a 50 percent change. The brown-ﬁlled bars show the changes of wages for employees who
do not get a bonus while the red empty bars indicate the distribution for workers receiving a
bonus. Panel A shows that the nominal wage of workers without a bonus is completely rigid
downward while the wage of workers receiving a bonus is ﬂexible. Panel B shows that the
base wage is downward rigid for workers with and without a bonus alike. Consequently, we
can conclude that bonus payments are the reason for wage ﬂexibility.
Inﬂation can ease the eﬀects of wage rigidity as ﬁrms can decrease real wages without
cutting the nominal value of the compensation of workers if the inﬂation rate is higher.
Therefore, I compare the wage change distribution of workers in a low and high-inﬂation
environment. As inﬂation was much higher in Hungary before 2001, Panel (a) and (b) of
Figure ?? in the Appendix plots the distribution of wage changes by decade. Panel (a) shows
the distribution of wage changes for workers without a bonus. In the high-inﬂation period
before 2001, the median of the wage changes was larger and the spike at 0 was smaller than
in the low-inﬂation period. In addition, nominal wage drops were scarce irrespective of the
inﬂation rate. We can conclude that higher inﬂation eases but does not eliminate downward
nominal wage rigidity in the case of workers without a bonus. On the other hand, Panel (b)
shows that the wages of bonus receiving workers are ﬂexible regardless of the inﬂation rate.
If the inﬂation rate is higher, average wage growth is also higher and nominal wage drops
are less frequent. At the same time, there is no large spike at 0 and the probability of small
wage decreases is approximately the same as the probability of small wage increases. Last
but not least, Panel (c) of Figure ?? in the Appendix shows the distribution of real wage
changes for workers with and without a bonus. It is clearly observable that wage change
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distribution is continuous around 0, and we cannot ﬁnd either a spike or bunching around 0.
This graph suggests that wages in Hungary are only nominally rigid but not in real terms12.
The employment and wage response of ﬁrms
5 Employment and wage reaction of the ﬁrms
5.1 Estimation strategy
To determine the eﬀect of bonus payments on separation rates and wage adjustment I estimate
the following equation:
∆log(wagejit) = α1∆log(salesj(it))+α2bonusji+α3bonusji∗∆log(salesj(it))+αXjit−1+µt+εit
(11)
where the dependent variable is the change in the wage of worker i at ﬁrm j between
year t− 1 and t. ∆log(salesj(i,t)) stands for the change of the nominal sales revenue of ﬁrm
j between year t− 1 and t. This variable is the same for every worker of the ﬁrm. Bonusij
indicates whether worker i at ﬁrm j received extra compensation elements in addition to the
base wage at least once during the observed periods. denotes the control variables while µt
stand for year dummies to get rid of the eﬀect of inﬂation. The main variable of interest
is the interaction between bonuses and changes in sales revenue. If α3 is positive, ﬁrms can
adjust the wages of incumbents more by paying bonuses.
To compute the employment response of ﬁrms with and without bonuses, I estimate
Equation 12 with a dummy variable on the left hand side denoting whether the worker of
12 This result is in line with the estimates of Kátay (2011) who also found a very low downward real wage
rigidity in Hungary.
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the ﬁrm is separated between year t− 1 and t.
I(sepjit = 1) = β1∆log(salesj(it))+β2bonusji+β3bonusji∗∆log(salesj(it))+βXjit−1 +µt+εit
(12)
If ﬁrms pay bonuses to decrease wage rigidity then we expect that the probability of
separations at the ﬁrm co-moves with sales revenue more tightly in the case of workers
without bonuses. This implies thatβ1 is negative while β3 is positive. In contrast, the
incentive contract explanation for bonus payments suggests that the probability of separation
is independent from ﬁrm-level revenue shocks which implies that β1 and β3 are both zero in
this case. Finally, the sign of β2 can be used to distinguish between the two explanations of
bonus payments. The incentive contract explanation for bonus payments suggests that the
expected utility of workers with bonuses is higher, so they are less likely to leave the ﬁrm,
which implies that β2 is negative. By contrast, the wage ﬂexibility explanation suggests that
bonus receiving workers have lower utility than workers with ﬁxed wages which implies that
β2 is positive.
Individual-level estimations have two important weaknesses. First, they implicitly assume
that workers are independent within ﬁrms in the sense that the wage rigidity of one worker
does not aﬀect the separation rate of other workers. In addition, ﬁrms may be able to decrease
average wages without adjusting the number of employees if they ﬁre workers and hire new
ones at lower wages. This mechanism provides wage ﬂexibility at ﬁrm-level even if individual
wages are downward rigid and the separation rate is independent from sales revenue shocks13.
To control for this mechanism, I aggregate Equations 11 and 12 at ﬁrm level and estimate
the following equations:
13A large body of literature shows that the wages of newly hired workers are more pro-cyclical than the
wages of incumbents (Pissarides, 2009; Carneiro et al., 2012; Haefke et al., 2013; Kudlyak, 2014).
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∆log(wagejt) = γ1∆log(salesjt)+γ2bonusjt−1 +γ3bonusjt−1∗∆log(salesjt)+γXjt−1 +µt+εit
(13)
∆log(empjt) = δ1∆log(salesjt) + δ2bonusjt−1 + δ3bonusjt−1 ∗∆log(salesjt) + δXjt−1 +µt + εit
(14)
where the dependent variable is either the change of average wages or the change of
employment at ﬁrm j between year t − 1 and t. ∆log(salesjt) denotes the change of sales
revenue between years t − 1 and t while bonusjt−1 denotes the share of workers receiving a
bonus at year t−1. If bonus payments provide the ﬁrms additional ﬂexibility then we expect
that γ3 is positive in the wage equation. In the employment equation, we expect that β1 is
positive due to reverse causality. If the number of workers changes due to exogenous reasons,
the output of the ﬁrms will change as well because workers are one of the production factors
of ﬁrms. Still, if ﬁrms pay bonuses to smooth employment, we expect that δ3 is negative,
but if ﬁrms pay bonuses to incentivize workers, we expect that δ3 is not negative14.
5.2 Results
Panel A in Figure 3 shows a non-parametric estimate for Equation 11 . I grouped worker-
year observations in twenty equally sized bins by the change of the sales revenue of the
employers and plotted the average change of wages for workers with and without a bonus.
It is clear that the wages of workers receiving a bonus change more due to revenue shocks
than the wages of workers without a bonus. The only diﬀerence between the theoretical
14Note: Firm-level estimations are not suﬃcient either as a tool to compare the diﬀerent explanations for
bonus payments as only individual level regressions can show the wage adjustment of incumbents and the
lower separation rate of bonus receiving workers.
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and empirical investigation is that the wages of workers without a bonus also co-moves with
the revenue of the ﬁrms to some extent. Contrary to the model, the sales of ﬁrms are not
stationary over time. If the productivity of ﬁrms shows a positive trend, their sales revenue
and wages increase over time as well. If there are diﬀerences in ﬁrm-level growth rates, the
time dummies cannot control for the positive correlation between the growth rate of sales
revenue and wages. This phenomenon is true independent from the structure of wages15.
In contrast to wages, the probability of separation does not co-move with the change of
the sales revenue of the ﬁrm if the size of the shock is not very large. As panel B in Figure
3 illustrates, the probability of remaining at the ﬁrm is approximately constant for workers
receiving and not receiving a bonus alike. Moreover, the probability of separations is lower if
the worker receives a bonus in a given year. This contradicts the wage ﬂexibility explanation
for bonus payments but is in line with the incentive contract explanation as the latter model
suggests that bonus paying ﬁrms oﬀer a higher utility to their workers so they can attract
the workers of ﬁrms not paying bonuses.
Panel B in Figure 3 shows the survival rate of jobs, which is conditional on the employing
ﬁrm remaining in the Wage Survey the next year. As a ﬁrm can only participate in the
Wage Survey if it had not gone bankrupt earlier, estimates for job survival rates are biased
if the probability of bankruptcy is correlated with the decision to pay bonuses. To control
for this possibility, Graph A-4 shows the survival rates of jobs regardless of the participation
of the ﬁrms in the Wage Survey. In this graph, I consider a job as separated if the ﬁrm is
not observed in the Wage Survey the next year. As ﬁrms do not necessary go bankrupt if
they do not participate in the Wage Survey, this method underestimates the survival rate of
jobs. In line with the expectations, the estimated probability of job survival dropped but the
results are qualitatively similar. Survival rates are almost uncorrelated with the changes in
revenue and workers without bonuses are more likely to be separated.
The point estimates for Equation 11 are shown in Panel (a) of Table 3 and the ﬁrst column
15Note: I also estimate equations 11 and 12 with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to control for diﬀerences in the growth
rates of the ﬁrms. The results are virtually the same. Besides Section 6.1 directly adresses this issue.
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corresponds to Figure 3(a). The sales revenue of the ﬁrm increases by 10 percent while the
wages of workers without a bonus increase by approximately 0.3-0.4 percent. Conditional
and unconditional wage adjustment are approximately the same but wage adjustment is
slightly lower depending on the observables. More importantly, wage adjustment in the case
of workers receiving a bonus is almost three times as large as wage adjustment in the case of
workers without a bonus. If the sales revenue of ﬁrms changes by 10 percent, the wages of
workers receiving a bonus changes by 0.7-0.8 percent more than the wages of workers without
bonuses.16 In addition, this result is highly signiﬁcant and robust to the inclusion of control
variables and sample restrictions.
Panel B in Table 3 summarizes the point estimates for the employment equation. Simi-
larly, the ﬁrst column shows the slope parameters of the lines in Figure 3(b). It is observable
that the probability of separation is approximately 25 percent lower if the worker received a
bonus in a given year. This diﬀerence is robust to including control variables and to omitting
ﬁrms with more than 500 employees. These point estimates are in line with the predictions of
the incentive contract explanation for bonus payments, as bonus payments are connected with
a higher utility and lower separation rate of workers. By contrast, the connection between
the separation rate and changes in sales revenue is very weak in the case of moderate revenue
shocks. Furthermore, the separation rate of workers receiving a bonus is negatively corre-
lated with the revenue shocks hitting ﬁrms. The estimated coeﬃcient for the interaction term
suggests that if the revenue of ﬁrms increases by 10 percent, the separation rate of workers
receiving a bonus decreases by 0.6 percent more than the separation rate of workers without
a bonus. Thus, the empirical ﬁndings deﬁnitely contradict the wage ﬂexibility explanation
for bonus payments as bonus payments do not help ﬁrms to smooth employment17.
It may be possible that workers with diﬀerent characteristics cannot be incentivized with
16These results are similar to the estimates of Kátay (2008). He found that wage elasticity to productivity
shocks is between 0.05 and 0.1.
17Theoretically, it is possible that one type of the ﬁrms can smooth employment without smoothing wages
while another type of the ﬁrms cannot smooth employment even by paying bonuses and having downward
ﬂexible wages. However, in this case, we would expect that bonus paying ﬁrms have a larger separation rate
as well.
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the same wage structure. Therefore, I re-estimate Equation 11 by diﬀerent worker groups
separately. The result are shown in Table A-1. First, I do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence in the eﬀect
of bonuses in the case of males and females. Second, I estimate the parameters of interest
diﬀerently for blue and white collar workers because the eﬀort of blue collar workers may
be observed more easily and their employment dropped more during the Great Recession
(Köll®, 2011). Finally, I estimate the model separately for tradeable and non-tradeable
sectors. As Hungary is a small open economy this separation is motivated by the assumption
that the ﬁrms in tradeable sectors face more ﬁerce competition which may aﬀect the wage
and employment adjustment of ﬁrms18. The point estimates are qualitatively the same in all
of the subgroups.
Robustness The bonus deﬁnition I use in the main analysis is arbitrary, so Table A-2
shows the robustness of my results to diﬀerent bonus deﬁnitions. In Column (1), a worker
is deﬁned as receiving a bonus if she got a bonus in the previous year. Although the point
estimates changed, the results qualitatively remained the same since the wage response of
workers receiving a bonus is larger if the revenue of the ﬁrm changes. In comparison, the
average wage growth of workers without a bonus is 5 percent lower than the wages of workers
receiving a bonus. The reason for this is that although some workers do not receive a bonus
because of temporary weak performance they expect to get a bonus in the next year. This
eﬀect increases the average wage growth of workers who are categorized in this speciﬁcation
as not receiving a bonus. Similarly, the conditional separation rate of workers with a bonus
increased compared to workers without a bonus. The result suggests that this deﬁnition of
bonus payment mistakenly categorizes some workers as not receiving a bonus. Still, in the
case of this deﬁnition, the partial eﬀect of sales revenue changes on the probability of the
separation of workers receiving a bonus is not lower either. The results are qualitatively the
same if I deﬁne workers as receiving a bonus if the additional compensation elements over
their base wage comprised at least 10 percent of their total wages (Column 2) or if their
18I estimated the model separately for exporters and non-exporters but the results were similar, so I do
not present them.
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base wage is lower than their total compensation even if they did not receive any additional
elements over the base wage (Column 3)19.
Column (4) of Table A-2 regards workers as receiving extra elements over their base wage
if they got monthly or occasional bonuses or premia. Under this speciﬁcation, I do not con-
sider overtime payment, reimbursements and allowances for special working conditions as
extra elements over the base wage. One could argue that overtime can be directly controlled
by the ﬁrms and ﬁrms only pay them because of legal obligations. The requirements for al-
lowances and reimbursements can also be independent of the unobserved eﬀort of individuals.
Accordingly, these wage elements may similarly have only weak incentive eﬀects. The point
estimates are very close to the main results and they are in line with the incentive contract
explanation for bonus payments.
Finally, Column 5 shows that non-ﬁnancial remuneration does not co-move with sales
revenue so ﬁrms without bonuses do not smooth employment costs by adjusting non-ﬁnancial
remuneration.
Table A-3 concerns robustness to changing the estimation sample. In the ﬁrst column,
I include ﬁrms with less than 20 or more than 2500 workers in the sample and in Column
(2) I re-estimate the model without weighting. The point estimates are basically unchanged.
Another concern about the results may be that I arbitrarily trimmed the distribution of sales
revenue shocks at 50 percent. For this reason, Column (3) and Column (4) take into account
revenue changes which are lower than 30 and 20 percent, respectively, while Column (5)
winsorizes the wage distribution instead of trimming. The results remained the same.
In the last three columns of Table A-2, I deal with the issue of wage under-reporting in
Hungary. Previous research in Hungary highlighted that some employers under-report wages
19 If the worker is partly or completely paid on an hourly basis or based on a piece rate, the Wage Survey
reports a base wage lower than the total compensation, even without any additional elements over the base
wage indicated.
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to decrease tax liability. In Column (6), I re-estimate Equation 11, using ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects.
The implicit assumption here is that there is no heterogeneity in wage under-reporting within
ﬁrms. In Column (7), I omit workers receiving a minimum wage. The assumption here is
that if the wage of a worker is under-reported, the reported wage is the lowest possible, i.e.
the minimum wage. These speciﬁcations are in line with the previous results. The wages
of workers receiving a bonus co-move more tightly with the sales revenue of ﬁrms and the
ﬂexibility of wages does not help ﬁrms in smoothing employment. Interestingly, under this
speciﬁcation, the wages of workers without a bonus are conditionally uncorrelated with the
sales revenue of the ﬁrm. I re-estimated the model also by omitting ﬁrms with less than 100
employees because it is more like that smaller ﬁrms try to evade taxes (Kleven et al., 2011).
As each of these speciﬁcations produce results similar to the main speciﬁcations, I conclude
that my results are not driven by wage under-reporting.
Firm-level evidence Table 4 shows ﬁrm-level estimations. Similarly to the individual-
level analysis, the average wages received at ﬁrms not paying a bonus increase by 0.3 percent
in the aftermath of a 10 percent revenue shock and wages at bonus paying ﬁrms are adjusted
by 0.3-0.7 percent more. This results is robust to introducing control variables (Columns
(3) and (4)) and to weighting with employment. On the other hand, average nominal wage
growth is sightly lower at bonus paying ﬁrms. To sum up, we can reject the hypothesis
that ﬁrms not paying bonuses adjust wages as much as bonus paying ﬁrms by ﬁring workers
and hiring new ones for a lower wage. The most important diﬀerence between the ﬁrm-level
and the individual-level analysis is in the employment equation. I ﬁnd that a one percent
change in sales revenue corresponds to a 0.3 percent change in employment level although
the separation rate is nearly uncorrelated with sales revenue shocks. The diﬀerence between
the two results is caused by reserve causality. For example, if the employment level changes
accidentally for an exogenous reason, ﬁrm output will also change as labor is one of the
inputs of production20. On the other hand, the interaction between bonus payments and
20If we assume that the production function of the ﬁrms is Cobb-Douglas then these estimates are consistent
with a labor share of 1/3.
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sales revenue is very close to zero and has small standard error, indicating that ﬁrms paying
a bonus do not smooth employment more21. In Columns (5) and (6), I omit ﬁrms with more
than 500 workers and in the last two columns of Table 4 I deﬁne a worker as receiving a
bonus if she got additional elements besides the wage base in the previous year. The results
remained the same. Therefore, we can conclude that the ﬁrm-level analysis is in line with
individual-level results and supports the incentive contract explanation for bonuses.
6 The expected value and volatility of growth rates
6.1 Estimation strategy
One possible threat of my estimation strategy is that the growth rate of ﬁrms and bonus
payment strategy are correlated. For example ﬁrm with rigid wages may not ﬁre workers
even in case of negative revenue shocks because they have larger and less volatile growth
rates. In this case, ﬁrms not paying bonuses smooth employment because their prospects are
better than those of ﬁrms not paying any bonus. To test this hypothesis, I run the following
regressions:
∆log(salesj(it)) = λ0 + λ1bonusji + λXjit + εit (15)
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of sales revenue and bonusij indicates
whether the worker received a bonus. Xit refers to the control variables, including year
dummies . For a better understanding, I demean the control variables so λ0 shows the
conditional growth rate of ﬁrms employing workers without paying a bonus22. The main
coeﬃcient of interest is λ1, showing whether workers receiving a bonus work at ﬁrms with a
lower growth rate.
21Note: It may be possible that the labor share is larger in the production function of bonus paying ﬁrms.
That is why the interaction term may be upward biased. To rule out this possibility, I control for the share
of labor with the ratio of the total wage bill and the sales revenue of the ﬁrm and interact it with changes in
sales revenue. The results remained the same.
22Note: I demean the control variables in Equations 15 and 16.
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I also estimate the conditional variance of growth rates using a method similar to White
(1980). First, I predict the residuals εˆ2it from Equation 15 and estimate the following equation:
εˆ2it = κ0 + κ1bonusit + λXit + νit (16)
where the control variables are exactly the same as in Equation 15. κ0 shows the condi-
tional variance of the growth rate of ﬁrms employing workers without bonus payment. The
most important parameter is again the coeﬃcient of the bonus indicator. If ﬁrms pay a bonus
to motivate high eﬀort with proﬁt sharing, we may expect that workers receiving a bonus
work at ﬁrms where the conditional volatility of the growth rate is lower. As opposed to this,
if ﬁrms pay a bonus to smooth their proﬁt, it is expected that bonus receiving employees
work at ﬁrms with a more volatile growth rate.
6.2 Results
The parameter estimates for Equation 15 are shown in the upper panel of Table 5. The most
important ﬁnding is that workers receiving a bonus do not work at companies with a lower
growth rate. Based on the raw diﬀerence, workers receiving a bonus work at ﬁrms which have
a 1 percent larger growth rate than the ﬁrms of workers without a bonus. The diﬀerence
disappears if we take into account ﬁrm-level control variables; the estimated coeﬃcient is
very close to zero and not signiﬁcant. Based on these results, we cannot conclude that ﬁrms
pay a bonus to smooth the eﬀect of lower growth rates.
The lower panel of Table 5 shows the conditional volatility of growth rates. The dependent
variable is the square-residual of equations from the upper panel. The upper and lower panel
feature the same control variables in their columns. According to the ﬁrst column, workers not
receiving a bonus work at ﬁrms where the unconditional variance of growth is approximately
4 percentage point. In contrast, in the case of workers receiving a bonus, the unconditional
variance is 1 percentage point lower. The point estimates do not change signiﬁcantly if
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we take into account the diﬀerences in ﬁrm-level characteristics. However, the diﬀerence in
variance more than halves if we include every control variable. By contrast, the conditional
variance of the growth rate is approximately the same in the case of both smaller and larger
ﬁrms. Although the point estimates are small, they are signiﬁcant in economic terms. The
-0.0035 coeﬃcient for the bonus payment dummy means that the variance of the growth
rate is more than 10 percentage points lower in the case of ﬁrms employing workers with
bonus payment. Based on the results, we can reject the hypothesis that ﬁrms pay a bonus
to counterbalance the larger uncertainty in sales revenue.
The model with endogenous separations suggests that the relationship between the volatil-
ity of growth rates and the prevalence of bonuses is not linear. Therefore, Figure 4(a) shows
the probability of receiving bonuses as a function of the volatility of growth rates. I grouped
the worker-year observations into twenty bins by unconditional variance in the growth rates
of the employer and plotted the share of workers receiving a bonus in every bin. In line with
the incentive contract explanation of bonus payments, the probability of bonus payments
is strictly decreasing with the volatility of growth rates. It is unlikely that the model with
endogenous separations can explain this relationship as the model predicts that ﬁrms with
very low volatility in growth rates do not pay bonuses. Figure 4(b) controls for confounding
factors but the result is qualitatively unchanged.
7 Assessing alternative explanations for bonus payments
Screening of workers : Some theoretical models (Lazear 1986; 000b Park and Sturman, 2015)
show that ﬁrms may use state-dependent contracts to screen workers but empirical results
are not conclusive as to whether this type of contract attracts the most productive (Bandiera
et al., ming) or the least risk-averse workers (Kandilov and Vukina, 2015). In my setup, it
is possible that ﬁrms share the revenue with the workers to select the best of them but if
the volatility of sales is too large, sales are not informative enough to diﬀerentiate between
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employees. However, in this case, every ﬁrm should oﬀer a menu of wages and let the worker
choose between the ﬁxed-wage and the output-dependent wage structure. On the contrary,
Figure 1shows that almost every worker of the largest ﬁrms receives bonuses. This suggests
that the largest ﬁrms do not maximize proﬁt by only oﬀering wages with bonus payments or
the main motivation of paying bonuses is not to screen workers.
Retention eﬀect: Oyer (2004); Oyer and Schaefer (2005) show that stock options decrease
turnover if the value of stock options are correlated with labor market conditions and with
the outside options of workers. It is possible that ﬁrms with the lowest variance try to cope
with outside wage oﬀers by paying state-dependent wages. This theory can explain the lower
separation rates of bonus paying ﬁrms but cannot explain why the bonus receiving workers
are more productive.
Managerial practices: Diﬀerences in the skills of the management can be one important
factor in the decision about bonus payment. It is possible that high-ability managers can
monitor workers' eﬀort more precisely or they can more eﬃciently anticipate and avoid sales
revenue shocks, and that is why ﬁrms with a better management use incentive contracts.
These kinds of diﬀerences in managerial practices do not contradicts the incentive contract
explanation for bonus payments. On the other hand, managerial practices can aﬀect the ﬁrm-
level outcome through other channels as well. Therefore, Table A-3, Column 5 includes ﬁrm-
ﬁxed eﬀects to control for managerial diﬀerences which are constant over time. In addition,
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007); Bloom et al. (2013) showed that better management practices
lead to a higher growth rate. As Table5 shows that average sales growth is not larger at
bonus paying ﬁrms, I conclude that diﬀerences in managerial practices which are conditional
on contract types cannot drive the results.
Tax optimization: Oyer and Schaefer (2005) suggests that stock options may be paid
partly because they are taxed at lower average rates. However, the base wage and bonuses
are taxed exactly the same way, so tax optimization cannot explain bonus payments. Also,
this is why personal income tax rates cannot account for the cross-sectional diﬀerences in
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bonus payments either.
Wage under-reporting: Some ﬁrms under-report wages to evade taxes in Hungary (Elek
et al., 2009, 2012; Tonin, 2011). It may be possible that ﬁrms without bonuses adjust unre-
ported wages in case of negative revenue shocks. I address this concern ﬁrst by re-estimating
the main results without minimum wage earners (Table A-3, Column 6). This controls for
wage under-reporting, since if a worker gets unreported wage, her wage is the lowest possible,
i.e. the minimum wage. In Column 7, I re-estimate the model after omitting ﬁrms having less
then 100 workers because the smallest ﬁrms are the most likely to engage in tax evasion activ-
ities (Kleven et al., 2011)23. Finally, ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects also control for wage under-reporting
if the wages of all workers within ﬁrms are under-reported to the same extent. As my results
are robust against these changes, I conclude that it is not wage under-reporting that helps
ﬁrms to smooth employment in case of negative revenue shocks.
Real vs nominal wage rigidity Firms can decrease real wages when inﬂation is high so
nominal wage rigidity is an important issue only if the inﬂation rate is low. Therefore, I
divide the sample into a time period before and after 2001. With an average rate of 13.9
percent, inﬂation before 2001 was high in Hungary , followed by a moderately low 4.8 percent
afterwards. The results are shown in Columns (7) and (8) of Table A-3 and are very similar
in both cases. The only diﬀerence between the two subsamples is that the wages of workers
without bonuses co-move with sales revenue in the high-inﬂation sample only. This result is
in line with Elsby (2009) as in a high-inﬂation environment downward nominal wage rigidity
is less binding so ﬁrms are more willing to raise wages even for workers with rigid wages.
23I cannot omit medium-size ﬁrms because in this case I would also omit almost every workers without a
bonus.
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8 Conclusion
I proposed a new equilibrium search model to compare the incentive contract and wage
ﬂexibility explanations for bonus payments. If the main motivation for bonus payments is to
smooth the wage bill without ﬁring workers, the model predicts that bonus paying ﬁrms will
be smaller, with a larger variance in their sales revenue. By contrast, if ﬁrms pay bonuses
to provide an incentive for high worker eﬀort, the model predicts that bonus paying ﬁrms
will be larger and more productive but they will also have a lower variance in their sales
revenue and lower separation rates. In the second case, the downward wage ﬂexibility of
bonus payment is only the side eﬀect of incentive contracts. I also tested the predictions of
my model using the Hungarian linked employer-employee database and found that the data
support the incentive contract explanation for bonus payments. The policy relevance of my
results is that the decision of ﬁrms about wage ﬂexibility is unlikely to be driven by cyclical
considerations, which means that the employment eﬀects of wage rigidity are overestimated.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 It is assumed that the expected utility of workers at ﬁrm j is Uj.
It is obvious that ﬁrms opt for bj = 0 and wj = Uj if they do not want to incentivize workers.
If they intend to incentivize workers, they have to solve the following proﬁt maximization
problem:
max
∏
(bj, wj) = (1− bj)(p+ e¯)− wj
such that: (1− bj)(p+ e¯)− wj ≥ p− Uj
wj + bj(p+ e¯)− b2j ∗ r ∗ var(εj)− ce¯ ≥ Uj
The two constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints which have to be met at
optimum. The ﬁrst condition states that the proﬁt per worker of ﬁrms should be at least as
large in the case of incentive contracts as in the case of ﬁxed wage contracts. The second
constraint ensures that workers exerting high eﬀort cannot have a lower utility than shirking
workers.
As ﬁrms want to maximize proﬁt, they should decrease the expected value of wages
until the incentive compatibility condition of the worker allows. In this case, bj = c and
c2 ∗ r ∗ var(εj) + ce¯+Uj = wej . If this is combined with the incentive compatibility constraint
of the ﬁrm, it is optimal to use incentive contracts, if and only if e¯∗(1−c)
c2∗r ≥ var(εj).
Proof of Proposition 2 b is used to denote a ﬁrm oﬀering an incentive contract and f
for one that oﬀers a ﬁxed wage contract. In this case, the following inequalities apply:
(Pb−Ub)∗N(Ub, F ) ≥ (Pb−Uf )∗N(Uf , F ) ≥ (Pf−Uf )∗N(Uf , F ) ≥ (Pf−Ub)∗N(Ub, F )
The ﬁrst and the third inequalities are implied by the equilibrium condition of Equation
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5. The second inequality applies as Pb ≥ Pf 24. These inequalities imply that
(Pb − Pf ) ∗N(Ub, F ) ≥ (Pb − Pf ) ∗N(Uf , F )⇒ N(Ub, F ) ≥ N(Uf , F )
As ﬁrm size is a strictly monotonous function of wages, the last inequality implies that
Ub ≥ Uf .
Proof of Proposition 3
The ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maximization is the following:
dProfitj
dUj
= 0⇒ (Pj − Uj) ∗ ∂N((F (Uj), bj, var(εj))/∂wj
N((F (Uj), bj, var(εj))
= 1 (17)
Using Equation 17 and the fact that ∂F (UJ )
∂bj
= ∂F (UJ )
∂Uj
∗ (−2bjrvar(ε)) we arrive at the
following equation:
dProfitj
dbj
= −4rbvar(εj) ∗N((F (Uj), bj, var(εj)) (18)
Equation 18 shows that the proﬁt of the ﬁrm is decreasing in the proﬁt sharing parameter.
So the ﬁrms which smooth employment choose the lowest bj which satisﬁes Equation 10. If
the var(εj) is small enough then Equation 10 holds even if bj = 0. That is why ﬁrms with
less volatile revenue can oﬀer ﬁxed wages but do not ﬁre workers during recession.
Firms do not ﬁre workers if the expected proﬁt of revenue sharing is also larger than the
expected proﬁt of oﬀering a ﬁxed wage and ﬁring workers during recessions. To compute this
incentive compatibility constraint, I derive the expected proﬁt of ﬁrms if they oﬀer a ﬁxed
wage and do not smooth employment. After hiring a worker, the ﬁrm has p− Uj + εj proﬁt
with 50 percent probability and 0 otherwise. The probability that the worker gets a better
wage oﬀer is λ(1− F (Uj)) so the worker wants to stay at the ﬁrm in the next period with a
probability of (1 − λ(1 − F (Uj)) − δ). The probability of a negative shock is 50 percent so
the worker remains at the ﬁrm with 0.5 ∗ (1− λ(1−F (Uj))− δ) probability. To sum up, the
expected present value of a worker is
24The equality holds if and only if e∗(1−c)c2∗r = var(εj).
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E(prof.|not smooth) =
∞∑
t=0
(0.5∗(1−λ(1−F (Uj))−δ))t∗(p− Uj + εj
2
) =
p− Uj + εj
1 + λ(1− F (Uj)) + δ)
(19)
If the ﬁrm smooths employment by revenue sharing then the expected per period proﬁt
is Pj − Uj. Now the ﬁrms do not want to ﬁre workers so the probability of remaining at the
ﬁrm is 1− λ(1− F (Uj))− δ) which implies that the expected proﬁt is
E(prof.|smooth) =
∞∑
t=0
(1− λ(1− F (Uj))− δ)t ∗ (Pj − Uj) = Pj − Uj
λ(1− F (Uj)) + δ) (20)
To sum up, the ﬁrm does not ﬁre workers if and only if
p− Uj + εj
1 + λ(1− F (Uj)) + δ ≤
Pj − Uj
λ(1− F (Uj)) + δ) (21)
After plugging in Equation 10, we get the following expression:
rvar(εj) [b(1− b)(1 + λ(1− F (Uj)) + δ)− b] ≤ Pj − Uj (22)
It is easy to see that the left hand side is increasing and the right hand side is linearly
decreasing in var(εj) so if the variance of the individual level shocks are large enough then
ﬁrms do not pay bonuses but ﬁre workers in case of negative sales revenue shocks.
Appendix B
Data Construction
The Structure of Earnings Survey are made by the National Employment Service. A
random sample of ﬁrms having at least 5 workers but less than 20 workers and all ﬁrms
having at least 20 workers have to report detailed information about their employees.
Companies having less than 20 workers have to report information about each employee
and ﬁrms having more than 20 workers have to report about 10 percent of their employees.
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The Survey is repeated cross-section on the individual level. Sample selection is based on
date of birth, as employers have to report on blue collar workers born on the 15th or 25th
day and white collar workers born on the 5th, 15th or 25th day of the month. The date of
birth within month is unlikely correlated with other relevant characteristics of individuals I
construct an individual-level panel using this date of birth. First, I construct cells within
ﬁrms using the year and month of birth, gender, the highest level of education completed
and the 4-digit occupational code. Using this method, 97 percent of the workers are alone
in their cells. It is improbable that ﬁrms ﬁre somebody and hire a new worker with exactly
the same characteristics. Therefore, the cells allow me with high certainty to link workers
between the years if workers do not change employer or occupation between the years25.
Firm-level data come from the corporate income tax returns sheets collected by the Na-
tional Tax and Customs Administration. The database contains the balance sheet and income
statement of every double entry book-keeping ﬁrm. The ﬁrms also have a unique identiﬁer
so they can be followed over time and ﬁrm-level revenue changes can be linked to the wage
information of the Structure of Earning Survey. Besides the revenue changes I also use the
tax return sheets of the ﬁrms to compute the value-added and ﬁxed-aﬀects per worker. To
rule out extreme shocks, I drop individuals who work at ﬁrms with very large changes in sales
revenue. More precisely, I use only observations where sales revenue of the ﬁrm changes by
less than 50 percent from one year to the next. This aﬀects approximately the largest and
smallest 5 percentile of sales growth distribution.
. .
25Between 2002 and 2008, the tenure of workers is also observable. When I used tenure instead of occupation
code for matching workers I found that less then one percent of workers changes occupation without leaving
the ﬁrm. The probability of changing occupation is uncorrelated with bonus payments.
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Table 1: The share of diﬀerent wage components in total worker compensation
prob. of receiving
the wage element
share of wage parts conditional on receiving
mean sd p25 p75
overtime payments 0.202 0.105 0.081 0.047 0.141
monthly bonuses and premia 0.210 0.216 0.189 0.078 0.300
occasional bonuses 0.440 0.085 0.078 0.033 0.112
allowances for special work conditions 0.387 0.124 0.094 0.054 0.175
reimbursements 0.368 0.054 0.075 0.020 0.061
total 0.778 0.221 0.182 0.082 0.312
Note: This table shows the probability of receiving additional wage elements over the base wage and the
share of these in total worker compensation.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: comparing the main characteristics of workers receiving and
not receiving a bonus
Total sample Conditional on remaining at the
ﬁrm until next May
no bonus bonus diﬀ t-stat no bonus bonus diﬀ t-stat
Average wage (log) 11.25 11.64 0.4 39.22 11.21 11.64 0.4 35.30
(0.0) (0.00) (0.0) (0.00)
Share of males 0.61 0.60 -0.01 -1.27 0.63 0.61 -0.02 -1.54
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Years of education 10.8 10.8 -0.02 -1.04 10.8 10.8 0.03 0.98
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Average age 38.77 39.83 1.054 9.06 39.86 40.47 0.609 3.79
(0.10) (0.08) (0.15) (0.07)
Number of employees 216.8 550.6 333.8 17.76 198.8 562.9 364.13 15.40
(12.7) (17.8) (15.83) (19.91)
Value added per worker (log) 7.494 7.870 0.38 15.49 7.309 7.786 0.48 15.34
(0.022) (0.019) (0.027) (0.021)
Earnings Before Interest &
Tax (Million HUF)
22511 67741 4523 4.41 12574 63638 5106 5.20
(6851) (1011) (3976) (1063)
Share of exporting ﬁrms 0.371 0.528 0.16 15.94 0.374 0.573 0.20 14.32
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
Proportion of new entrants
last year
0.194 0.124 -0.07 -24.59 0.148 0.097 -0.05 -13.75
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Age of ﬁrms 10.11 11.17 1.05 3.92 10.33 10.97 0.64 2.18
(0.18) (0.25) (0.22) (0.25)
Number of observations 221,881 903,411 49,528 393,957
Note: This table shows the weighted means and standard deviations for the worker-level data in the Wage
Survey. Firm-level variables show the characteristics of the employing ﬁrms.
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Table 3: Main results
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: change in wages
worker got bonus 0.000456 -0.000575 0.00222 0.000499
(0.00204) (0.00210) (0.00213) (0.00224)
change in sales revenue 0.0393*** 0.0365*** 0.0315*** 0.0310***
(0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0111)
interaction 0.0766*** 0.0752*** 0.0763*** 0.0796***
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0120)
Observations 379,998 379,998 374,488 254,680
R-squared 0.049 0.051 0.057 0.049
Panel B: probability of job separation
worker got bonus -0.244*** -0.247*** -0.255*** -0.240***
(0.00507) (0.00484) (0.00461) (0.00472)
change in sales revenue 0.0478*** 0.0365** 0.0146 0.00551
(0.0157) (0.0152) (0.0148) (0.0146)
interaction -0.0714*** -0.0638*** -0.0693*** -0.0501***
(0.0187) (0.0180) (0.0173) (0.0167)
year fe. x x x x
ﬁrm-level controls x x x
individual-level controls x x
without large ﬁrms* x
Observations 711,945 711,945 697,676 480,763
R-squared 0.033 0.043 0.062 0.066
Note: The table shows the eﬀect of bonus payment and sales revenue changes on diﬀerent outcomes. Column
1 shows the changes of sales revenue,
estimated coeﬃcients of Equation 11. Panel A shows the eﬀect of bonus payment and sales revenue changes
on the wages of workers. Panel B shows the eﬀect of these variables on the probability of job separation.
Columns (1) to (3) diﬀer in the control variables. Every column includes year dummies to get rid of the
eﬀect of inﬂation. Column (2) controls for log-capital per worker and log-sales per worker, the age of the ﬁrm
and 2-digit industry codes (NACE) while Column (3) also controls for sex, years of education, experience,
square of experience, a dummy indicator for being a new entrant and 2-digit occupation codes (ISCO 88). In
Column (4), I restrict the sample to the ﬁrms having less than 500 employees. Standard errors are clustered
at ﬁrm level.
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Table 5: Growth rate of ﬁrms
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: change in sales revenue
constant 0.0454*** 0.0564*** 0.0556*** 0.0474***
(0.00199 (0.00222) (0.0022) (0.00179)
worker got bonus 0.0124*** -0.00138 -0.000363 -0.00159
(0.00214 (0.00204) (0.00202) (0.00185)
Observations 1,075,581 1,049,736 1,049,586 774,539
R-squared 0.072 0.094 0.095 0.072
Panel B: conditional variance of sales revenue
constant 0.0394*** 0.0331*** 0.0330*** 0.0363***
(0.000565) (0.000564) (0.000558) (0.000489)
worker got bonus -0.0101*** -0.00367*** -0.00359*** -0.00298***
(0.000633) (0.000542) (0.000535) (0.000508)
year fe. x x x x
ﬁrm-level controls x x x
individual-level controls x x
without large ﬁrms* x
Observations 1,075,581 1,049,736 1,049,586 774,539
R-squared 0.008 0.063 0.064 0.047
Note: The table shows the estimated coeﬃcients of Equation 15 and 16. Panel A shows the diﬀerence in the
growth rate of ﬁrms employing workers with and without bonuses. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the
square of the predicted residual of Panel A. The coeﬃcients in panel B show the conditional variance of the
growth rate of ﬁrms employing workers with and without bonuses. Columns (1) to (3) diﬀer in the control
variables. Every column includes year dummies to get rid of the eﬀect of inﬂation. Column (2) controls
for log-capital per worker and log-sales per worker, the age of the ﬁrm and 2-digit industry categories while
Column (3) also controls for sex, years of education, experience, square of experience, a dummy indicator for
being a new entrant and 2-digit occupation categories. In Column (4), I restrict the sample to ﬁrms having
less than 500 employees. Standard errors are clustered at ﬁrm level.
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Table A-1: Heterogeneity in the wage and employment responses of the ﬁrm
females males tradeable
industries
non
tradable
industries
white
collar
blue
collar
Panel A: percentage change in wages
Share of workers with bonus 0.00991*** -0.00234 0.00115 0.00514 0.0169*** -0.00397
(0.00299) (0.00267) (0.00286) (0.00332) (0.00330) (0.00252)
change in sales revenue 0.0495*** 0.0226* 0.0230 0.0402*** 0.0494*** 0.0252**
(0.0151) (0.0130) (0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0183) (0.0123)
interaction 0.0515*** 0.0893*** 0.0919*** 0.0491*** 0.0380** 0.0913***
(0.0165) (0.0142) (0.0159) (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0136)
Observations 148,384 226,104 226,479 135,457 148,296 226,192
R-squared 0.066 0.053 0.064 0.046 0.068 0.053
Panel B: probability of job separation
Share of workers with bonus -0.258*** -0.252*** -0.271*** -0.234*** -0.262*** -0.252***
(0.00668) (0.00514) (0.00642) (0.00687) (0.00554) (0.00551)
change in sales revenue 0.0221 0.00908 -0.0126 0.0489** 0.0272 0.00845
(0.0212) (0.0170) (0.0203) (0.0222) (0.0201) (0.0174)
interaction -0.0906*** -0.0552*** -0.0435* -0.0972*** -0.0803*** -0.0648***
(0.0245) (0.0196) (0.0229) (0.0276) (0.0233) (0.0201)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 281,707 415,969 403,970 269,123 269,348 428,328
R-squared 0.065 0.061 0.056 0.070 0.067 0.062
Note: The table shows the heterogeneous eﬀects of bonus payments. Panel A shows the eﬀect of bonus
payment and sales revenue changes on the average wages of workers. Panel B shows the eﬀect of these
variables on the probability of remaining at the ﬁrm. Every column shows the eﬀects of bonus payments on
a diﬀerent subsample. Column (1) shows the eﬀect of bonuses on females and Column (2) on males. Column
(3) restricts attention on on workers in tradeable industries and Column (4) on worker in non tradeable
industies. Finally, Column (5) shows white collar workers and Column (6) blue collar workers. Every column
includes the the full set of control variables: log-capital per worker and log-sales per worker, the age of the
ﬁrm, 2-digit industry codes (NACE), sex, years of education, experience, square of experience, a dummy
indicator for being a new entrant and 2-digit occupation codes (ISCO 88) and year dummies to get rid of the
eﬀect of inﬂation. Standard errors are clustered on the ﬁrm level.
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Table A-2: Robustness to diﬀerent bonus deﬁnitions
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
got bonus
last year
bonus>0.1
wage
wage>base
wage
only
perform.
pay.
non-ﬁnancial
remuneration
Panel A: percentage change in wages
worker got bonus -0.0467*** -0.0586*** -0.0478*** 0.00487** 0.00338
(0.00207) (0.00163) (0.00229) (0.00199) (0.00286)
change in sales revenue 0.0656*** 0.0876*** 0.0650*** 0.0493*** 0.00610
(0.00935) (0.00641) (0.0103) (0.00972) (0.0163)
interaction 0.0433*** 0.0225** 0.0420*** 0.0623*** 0.00687
(0.0106) (0.00882) (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0167)
Observations 361,936 361,936 361,936 361,936 365,616
R-squared 0.061 0.069 0.061 0.056 0.302
Panel B: probability of job separation
worker got bonus -0.0827*** -0.0545*** -0.0812*** -0.269***
(0.00431) (0.00350) (0.00421) (0.00481)
change in sales revenue 0.0574*** 0.0532*** 0.0582*** -0.0206
(0.0146) (0.0109) (0.0151) (0.0142)
interaction 0.0215 0.0246 0.0212 -0.0884***
(0.0177) (0.0154) (0.0178) (0.0178)
controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 673,093 673,093 673,093 673,093
R-squared 0.037 0.035 0.036 0.074
Note: The table shows the estimated coeﬃcients of Equation 11. Panel A shows the eﬀect of bonus payment
and sales revenue changes on the wages of workers. Panel B shows the eﬀect of these variables on the
probability of separation. Columns (1) to (4) show diﬀerent bonus deﬁnitions. In Column (1), I deﬁne a
worker as receiving a bonus if she received a bonus last year, in Column (2) if the bonus part was more than
10 percent of base wage, in Column (3) if the base wage was less than the total wage and in Column (5)
if the worker received any performance payment except overtime payments. The dependent variable in the
last column is the amount of non ﬁnancial renumeration at the ﬁrm. Every column includes the the full set
of control variables: log-capital per worker and log-sales per worker, the age of the ﬁrm, 2-digit industry
categories, sex, years of education, experience, experience^2, a dummy indicator for being a new entrant and
2-digit occupation categories as well as year dummies to get rid of the eﬀect of inﬂation. Standard errors are
clustered at ﬁrm level.
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Figure 1: The share of workers receiving a bonus by the size of the ﬁrm
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Note: In this ﬁgure, worker-year observations are grouped into 20 equally-sized categories by the size of the
ﬁrm. The ﬁgure plots the share of workers receiving a bonus in every bin.
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Figure 2: The distribution of changes in worker compensation
(a) Total worker compensation
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(b) Base wage
Note: Panel (a) shows the distribution of wage changes for workers who do and do not receive bonuses.
Panel (b) shows the distribution of changes in base wage for both types of workers. The graphs show that
workers with a ﬁxed wage (brown-ﬁlled bars) only occasionally experience a nominal wage decline. Moreover,
the large spike at zero suggests that many ﬁrms prefer to keep wages intact to decreasing them. In contrast
to this, workers with bonuses (red bars) often experience a negative decline in their wages.
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Figure 3: The eﬀect of a change in sales revenue on wage and employment
(a) Wage change
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(b) Probability of job separation
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Note: In these ﬁgures, workers are grouped into equally-sized bins based on the change in the sales revenue
of their ﬁrms. Panel (a) shows the average change of wages for workers with and without bonuses. Panel B
shows the conditional probability of remaining at the ﬁrm if the ﬁrm remained in the sample the next year.
Both panels control for sex, experience, square of experience, years of education, capital and sales revenue
per worker in the base year, 2-digit occupation codes (ISCO 88), 2-digit industry codes (NACE) and year
dummies. The wage of workers receiving a bonus co-moves with the sales revenue of ﬁrms more tightly than
the wage of workers without a bonus, but there is no such diﬀerence in the probability of separations.
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Figure 4: The relationship between bonus payments and the volatility of growth rates
(a) Unconditional variance
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(b) Conditional variance
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Note: In these ﬁgures, workers are grouped into equally-sized bins based on the volatility of the growth rates
of their ﬁrms. The vertical axis shows the share of workers with bonuses. Panel (a) has no controls while
Panel (b) controls for sex, experience, square of experience, years of education, capital and sales revenue
per worker in the base year, 2-digit occupation codes (ISCO 88), 2-digit industry codes (NACE) and year
dummies. The wage of workers receiving a bonus co-moves with the sales revenue of ﬁrms more tightly than
the wage of workers without a bonus, but there is no such diﬀerence in the probability of separations. The
ﬁgures show that workers are less likely to get bonuses if the growth rate of the ﬁrm is more volatile. See
Section 6.1 for the estimation procedure.
55
Figure A-1: Macroeconomic environment
(a) Inﬂation
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(b) GDP growth and unemployment rate
Note: Panel (a) shows the annual inﬂation rate. I refer to the years before 2001 as the high-inﬂation period
and the years after 2001 as the low-inﬂation period in the robustness checks. Panel (b) shows that the
economy was relatively stable and there was no recession during the period under scrutiny. The source of
the data are the Central Bank of Hungary and the Hungarian Labor Force Survey.
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Figure A-2: The share of bonuses over the base wage
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Note: This ﬁgure presents the distribution of workers by the share of bonuses over the base wage.
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Figure A-3: The change of worker compensation and inﬂation
(a) workers without bonus
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(b) Workers receiving bonus
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(c) The change of real wages
Note: Figure (a) show the distribution of wage changes by decade for workers who do not receive a bonus.
Panel (b) shows the same for workers receiving a bonus. Changes of wages before 2001 when the inﬂation was
higher than 10 percent are included and Panel (b) shows the changes of wages after 2001 when the inﬂation
was below 8 percent. The third panel shows the distribution of changes in real wages for the two worker
groups. The graphs demonstrate that only nominal wages are downward rigid.
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Figure A-4: Probability of job separation
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Note: Workers are grouped into equally-sized bins based on the change of the sales revenue of the ﬁrm
employing them. The graph shows the conditional probability of remaining at the ﬁrm. Contrary to Figure
2, I consider a job to be separated if the ﬁrm does not participate in the Structure of Earnings Survey in
the next year. The control variables are sex, experience, square of experience, years of education, capital
and sales revenue per worker, 2-digit occupation codes (ISCO 98), 2-digit industry codes (NACE) and year
dummies. The graph shows that the probability of job survival is not correlated with the change in sales
revenueand the probability of job survival is larger if the worker received a bonus. .
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